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Abstract
While possessingmoral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic andmoral value, it remains
a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to
engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the
current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that
moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral
understanding to make a case for their favorite view of moral understanding. It is also argued that
proponents of exemplarist moral theories cannot remain neutral on whether the ability to engage
in moral reasoning is a necessary component of moral understanding.
Keywords Moral understanding .Moral testimony . Virtue .Moral exemplars .Moral
epistemology
1 Moral Understanding: Two Questions
A central discussion in moral epistemology concerns the epistemic standing that suffices for an
individual’s action to qualify as morally worthy and for the agent themselves to count as
morally virtuous. Generally speaking, many agree that one’s actions are incompatible with
moral virtue if the agent acts as they do out of moral deference, that is, if they come to believe
that X is right or wrong—and act accordingly—by virtue of blind trust in someone else. For
one thing, the pervasiveness of moral disagreement makes it unclear whether we can legiti-
mately talk about authority in the moral domain and assume we might be rational in deferring
to others on moral matters. For another, even if moral authorities existed and it were rational
for us to trust them on some occasions, it seems clear that something more than the ability to
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choose an advisor is required for us to aspire to moral virtue. We typically expect from morally
virtuous agents not only that they do the right thing in the right circumstances, but also that
they do so for the right reasons.
The notion of moral understanding is often seen to be a crucial requirement for one’s
actions to be compatible with moral virtue.1 Yet moral epistemologists disagree about how we
should conceive of the notion of moral understanding. In this paper, I shall focus on two
specific controversies about the nature of moral understanding, namely (i) whether it is
possible to acquire moral understanding via testimony, and (ii) whether it involves an ability
to engage in moral reasoning.
As regards (i), reductionists hold that moral understanding boils down to possessing a
sufficient amount of moral knowledge and take the fact that moral understanding can be
conveyed via testimony as an important virtue of their view. In contrast, non-reductionists have
it that possessing moral understanding requires that the subject grasps the relationship between
relevant pieces of information about the matter at hand—where the notion of ‘grasping’, as
will become clear, identifies an epistemic standing that is not necessary for a subject to possess
moral knowledge. On a non-reductionist perspective, the fact that testimony can convey moral
knowledge but not moral understanding is taken as evidence that the latter is irreducible to the
former.
The issue with (ii) is independent of the reductionism vs. non-reductionism division in
respect of (i) (Sliwa 2017: 525). Rather, it intertwines with another fundamental debate in
moral philosophy concerning whether the ability to account for one’s understanding is a
necessary feature of morally virtuous individuals. Intellectualists maintain that moral virtue
requires the possession of this capacity, while anti-intellectualists hold that one can be morally
virtuous without being able to give an account of why they act as they do.
This paper purports to advance both debates at once. As for (i), after briefly reconstructing
the debate between reductionists and non-reductionists about moral understanding and its
transmissibility via testimony (§2), I shall propose an account of moral understanding that
meets the dispositional requirements typical of non-reductionism and that nonetheless can be
conveyed via testimony, as reductionists predict (§3). My argument will support a surprising
conclusion, namely that neither view can appeal to the argument from moral testimony to
claim a positional advantage over its rival. As for (ii), my main goal is to shed light on the need
for further inquiry into the connections between moral epistemology and virtue ethics. In
particular, section 4 explores some implications of the intellectualism vs. anti-intellectualism
divide for Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (2017). I will argue that, given the
nature of the dispute, Zagzebski cannot remain neutral on whether morally virtuous individuals
need to possess the ability to engage in moral reasoning. I will also attempt to motivate the
surprising conclusion that, though her view is grounded in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, it sits
better with anti-intellectualism than with intellectualism when it comes to moral virtue.
2 Understanding-why, Knowing-why, and their Transmission
A good way to approach the divide between reductionists and non-reductionists about moral
understanding is to begin by establishing a few things on which they seem to agree.
1 For a discussion of this thesis see, e.g., Driver (2013), Hills (2016), Howell (2014), Sliwa (2017).
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First, both camps conceive of moral understanding as a species of understanding-why
relative to moral propositions. In general, understanding-why has to do with local or non-
holistic objects, such as propositions, local events, and the like (e.g., understanding why this
pizza is too crusty), and involves some degree of engagement with the reasons why something
is the case (e.g., with some considerations about the flour that has been used, the temperature
of the wood-oven in which it has been baked, or the baking time).2 If we apply these
considerations to the moral domain, we can think of moral understanding as understanding
why p, where p is a moral proposition such as “Plagiarism is wrong”, “You should apologize to
your brother”, or “Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad are good people”.
Second, it is standard to consider the notion of moral understanding as factive, namely one
according to which, for example, I understand why plagiarism is wrong if and only if
plagiarism is in fact wrong, or you understand why you should apologize to your brother if
and only if there is some fact of the matter which requires that you ask for your brother’s
forgiveness.3
Finally, reductionists and non-reductionists seem to agree that possessing moral under-
standing is a necessary condition for one to be a good moral advisor in some domain (Annas
2011: 20, 30, 41; Hills 2009: 126; Sliwa 2017: 550-ss), although some controversy remains
over whether moral understanding is the appropriate mental state one is required to hold
toward the reasons for one’s action, in order for such action to be morally worthy (Markovits
2010).
Before getting into the reasons behind the dispute between proponents of the two views, it
will be helpful to recall a distinction offered by Sliwa between possessing the capacity of
moral understanding and having acquired an instance of moral understanding (2017: 523-ss).
As we will see in §4, the former is key to addressing the question of the links between moral
understanding and moral virtue. In contrast, the debate between reductionists and non-
reductionists has to do with what is required for an individual to be credited with instances
of moral understanding. It is the latter meaning of the term that I am concerned with in the next
couple of sections.
The main point of disagreement between reductionists and non-reductionists concerns
whether moral understanding, intended as understanding-why p—where p amounts to a moral
proposition—reduces to knowing-why p. For the sake of simplicity, I shall focus on two
(paradigmatic) versions of the theories of moral understanding, namely Hills’ non-reductionist
view and Sliwa’s reductionist approach.
Consider the following propositions: “plagiarism is wrong” (p) because “it is a form of
stealing” (q). According to Hills, whether a subject S understands (or knows) why p depends
on the epistemic stance S entertains towards q, that is, with the reasons why p. Knowing why
plagiarism is wrong merely requires that S knows that plagiarizing amounts to stealing and that
this is the reason why it is wrong. Understanding why plagiarism is wrong, instead, requires
that S grasps the reasons why this is the case, where grasping involves a broad range of
abilities S needs to deploy. In particular, according to Hills, understanding why p entails that,
in the appropriate circumstances, S can successfully (2009: 102–103):
2 Detailed considerations on the various kinds of understanding can be found in, e.g., Carter and Gordon (2014),
Grimm (2014), Kvanvig (2009), and Pritchard (2009).
3 As regards factivity, discussion in moral epistemology walks partly away from the parallel debate in episte-
mology, where it is controversial whether understanding-why should be considered as a factive notion. Factive
accounts of understanding-why have been offered in, e.g., Kvanvig (2003) and Pritchard (2009). For non-factive
accounts of understanding-why, see, e.g., Elgin (2007) and Zagzebski (2001).
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& Follow an explanation of why p given by someone else;
& Explain why p in S’s own words;
& Draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the information that q;
& Draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the information that q’ (where p’
and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q);
& Given the information that p, give the right explanation, q;
& Given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’.
This list individuates necessary and (likely) sufficient abilities for S to possess moral under-
standing, that is, to have what Hills calls cognitive control over p (2016: 663).4 The fact that
cognitive control is composed of abilities, that is, dispositional elements coming in degrees,
explains why moral understanding is a gradable notion. This idea is quite intuitive, if we just
think that one can be more or less able to explain things in one’s own words, more or less able
to draw appropriate conclusions from given information, etc.
One of the arguments Hills advances to support a non-reductionist view of moral under-
standing is that, in general, knowledge-why is not sufficient for understanding-why; thus, a
fortiori, moral knowledge(−why) is not sufficient for moral understanding(−why). To prove
this, it is enough to show that one can easily possess knowledge-why p without having
cognitive control over p. Moral testimony seems to offer the kind of evidence that non-
reductionists are seeking.
Imagine a case in which Emily, a well-published scholar in ethics, tells her friend and
freshman Peter that “plagiarism is wrong because it is a form of stealing.” Peter can easily
acquire moral knowledge via testimony: he comes to believe p based on reason q through
Emily’s words and lacks reasons against her reliability; in fact, he has acquired inductive
evidence of her trustworthiness over time. Yet, Hills would argue, unless Peter reflects upon
what Emily told him and reaches cognitive control of p—i.e., that plagiarism amounts to
stealing others’ intellectual property and passing it off as your own—he fails to possess moral
understanding of why plagiarism is wrong. Moral testimony cannot provide Peter with the
necessary control because testimony cannot transmit the necessary abilities. Thus, knowledge
and understanding require different mental states: knowing requires assenting to the speaker’s
explanation of why p is the case, while understanding requires grasping the reasons why p is
the case, that is, the relationship between p and q (see Sliwa 2017: 531). In other words, moral
understanding requires cognitive work on the part of the agent who acquires it and, unlike
knowledge, “does not allow for a substantial division of epistemic labour” (Hills 2016: 671).5
Sliwa would give a completely different diagnosis of the plagiarism example. As I have
already mentioned, reductionists argue that moral understanding reduces to moral knowledge
because understanding-why p simply requires that one possesses a sufficient amount of
knowledge-why p, which, like any form of knowledge, can be acquired via perception and
inference but also via testimony. Thus, Sliwa’s explanation for why Peter lacks moral
understanding in the case above would not appeal to an asymmetry between knowledge and
understanding as mental states. Peter and Emily are in the same mental state; rather, they differ
4 See Callahan (2018) for an alternative formulation that is compatible with non-reductionist demands.
5 Hills also argues against the thesis that knowing-why is necessary for understanding-why by appealing to a
widely shared idea that understanding, unlike knowledge, is immune to certain forms of epistemic luck (e.g.,
Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2009; Zagzebski 2001). For the purposes of this paper, we can leave this argument
aside. Independent arguments against the transmissibility of moral understanding via testimony can be found in,
e.g., Callahan (2018), Enoch (2014), Fletcher (2016).
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in respect of how much they know about plagiarism. While Peter merely knows what his
friend has told him, Emily is able to “discriminate among various ways the world might be and
to correctly locate the actual world on the right side of the divide” (Sliwa 2017: 534). The
asymmetry, then, has to do with the epistemic possibilities that Emily, unlike Peter, can
discriminate: arguably, both can reject the idea that plagiarism is wrong because it harms
one’s physical well-being or it goes against gender equality, but only Emily has, say, a well-
developed concept of intellectual property, how stealing applies to others’ ideas or words, and
the difference between plagiarizing and infringing copyright.
On Sliwa’s account, the fact that Peter and Emily can individuate which epistemic
possibility concerning the wrongness of plagiarism obtains explains why both possess moral
knowledge. But since Emily, unlike Peter, can recognize a wider number of unrealized
epistemic possibilities and account for why they do not obtain, she has acquired an instance
of moral understanding while he lacks it. Moreover, the amount of knowledge one possesses
about the epistemic possibilities explaining why p determines how much one understands of p.
Thus, reductionism does not eliminate the intuitive difference between understanding as a
gradable notion and knowledge as an ‘all or nothing’ notion (538).
Reducing moral understanding to moral knowledge allows Sliwa to show that moral
understanding can be conveyed via testimony. All it takes for a speaker to distribute under-
standing why p is that they provide the hearer with enough knowledge of the epistemic
possibilities p involves or excludes. Insofar as Emily appropriately describes the wide realm of
reasons which might be invoked to justify the wrongness of plagiarism and specifies which
one in fact provides justification for p, Peter could acquire moral understanding via her
testimony.
Overall, the transmissibility of understanding via testimony on a particular occasion
depends on the issue at stake and on the epistemic competence of the subjects involved. In
some cases, a single, sufficiently comprehensive testimony can do all the work required for the
hearer to acquire understanding. In more complex cases—e.g., those involving matters for
which a specific expertise is required—transmitting understanding via testimony plausibly
demands that the hearer collect a series of pieces of testimony over time. For it might be a
while before they come to be in such a position that their body of knowledge includes or
excludes all the relevant epistemic possibilities concerning why p.
Having summarized the central claims of the two main views on the market and having
reconstructed the role that moral testimony plays within each theory, we can now show why
both reductionists and non-reductionists are wrong about it.
3 Testifying Moral Understanding: A Third Way
The goal of this section is to offer an alternative story of how testimony can pass on
instances of moral understanding. On the account I propose, moral understanding
includes a grasping component, as non-reductionists require, and yet nonetheless it can
be conveyed via testimony, as reductionists predict. Thus, the proposed account seeks to
demonstrate that neither view can appeal to the argument from moral testimony to claim
a positional advantage over its rival. If I am right, reductionists will lose the advantage of
being the only ones who can account for the transmission of moral understanding via
testimony. In contrast, non-reductionists will have to concede that testimony can convey
instances of moral understanding and therefore stop using the argument from the
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transmissibility via testimony as evidence of an asymmetry between knowledge and
understanding.6
This result should not discourage those who are interested in the debate about moral
understanding, nor should it prompt them to conclude that neither standard view has the
resources to offer a compelling analysis of moral understanding. Quite to the contrary, the
proposed account aspires to settle a longstanding controversy in moral epistemology in a way
that obligates reductionists and non-reductionists to stop wrangling over moral testimony and
propose different arguments in support of their positions.
The section is structured as follows. In §3.1, I introduce two problems for Sliwa’s reduc-
tionist take on the transmissibility of moral understanding via testimony. In §3.2, I outline my
alternative view of distributing moral understanding via testimony and show how it solves the
problems raised against reductionism. Finally, in §3.3 I defend the proposed view from a typical
worry with the fact that recipients of testimony lack epistemic credit for what they achieve.
3.1 Two Problems with Reductionism: Gradability and Knowing-why
The main issue with reductionist accounts of how testimony transmits moral understanding is
how to make sense of the idea that passing along some amount of knowledge-why provides
the hearer with understanding. Specifically, the reductionist proposal has problems with both
the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of moral understanding.
The main problemwith the quantitative dimension is that it is hard to set a minimum amount
of knowledge-why that should suffice for one to achieve moral understanding from another’s
testimony. A plausible reductionist answer would appeal to the realized and unrealized episte-
mic possibilities that a subject can properly relate to a given proposition p, but it would have to
require more than simply recognizing which epistemic possibility is instantiated in the actual
world. Returning to the plagiarism example, it cannot be the case that knowing that plagiarism
is a form of stealing is enough for Peter to understand why plagiarism is wrong. If reductionists
were to make such a claim, Emily’s original testimony would suffice to provide him with moral
understanding despite the fact that he does not entertain any other epistemic possibility for why
plagiarism is wrong. Thus, there would be no need for an account of understanding-why to
impose that one has to be able to discriminate which epistemic possibilities are not realized.
In contrast, non-reductionists appear to be in a position to avoid the problemwith theminimum
requirements for something to be an instance of understanding. For the grasping component of
moral understanding imposes a qualitative—rather than quantitative—difference between
knowing-why and understanding-why. Several definitions of the notion of grasping have been
given in the recent literature about understanding.What they all have in common is the idea that to
grasp something involves perceiving connections between different but related elements, ‘seeing’
their relationship, where this might even involve ‘aha’ or ‘eureka’ experiences.7 For the purposes
of this paper, then, suffice it to say that non-reductionists avoid the problem with the quantitative
dimension of understanding by assuming that knowledge and understanding are two separate and
somewhat independent epistemic states. Hence, no amount of knowledge-why will in itself allow
one to acquire understanding-why.
6 Recently, other attempts to settle this debate have been offered (e.g., Callahan 2018; Hills 2019). I take the main
virtue of my attempt to be the fact that it purports to solve the dispute without invoking any revision of the
traditional views or of the standard notion of moral understanding.
7 For more on the relation between understanding and ‘aha’ experiences, see, e.g., Grimm (2012), Kvanvig
(2011). For a thoughtful discussion about understanding and the virtue of insightfulness, see Carter (2017).
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Let us assume that reductionists can fix this problem by setting some kind of threshold of
knowing-why above which one counts as possessing moral understanding. The other problem
has to do with the qualitative dimension of moral understanding, that is, with the very idea that
by receiving via testimony enough information about the epistemic possibilities for why p is
the case, a hearer can acquire moral understanding. Imagine a revised version of the plagiarism
example, in which Emily not only tells Peter that plagiarism is wrong (p) because it is a form of
stealing (q), but she also mentions all the different reasons that could be adduced to justify the
immorality of plagiarizing and explains why it can be taken as a form of theft although nothing
is materially stolen. We can again suppose that Peter acquires a great deal of moral knowledge
via Emily’s testimony. However, this scenario is perfectly compatible with the fact that he
lacks any idea of how these reasons explain—or fail to explain—why p.
For it is enough for Peter to acquire testimonial knowledge that he makes minimal sense of
the content of Emily’s testimony and has evidence in favor of her reliability. This does not
necessarily involve having the resources to acknowledging the conceptual relationship be-
tween stealing and plagiarizing. Similarly, a patient can know why acid reflux can increase
asthma symptoms via their doctor’s explanation despite the fact that they do not understand the
doctor’s explanation of the complex mechanisms that regulate the interaction between diges-
tion and asthma. Thus, to the extent that Peter fails to recognize the connection between
stealing and plagiarizing, the reason why passing off another’s words as your own constitutes
an intellectual property theft, how plagiarism differs from copyright infringement, and so on
and so forth, he will still lack moral understanding—similarly, the patient who fails to
recognize how reflux affects asthma will lack understanding of why this is the case.
This example shows that it takes more for one to understand why p than to acquire testimonial
knowledge of the relationship between p and q, even when the speaker does their best to make that
connection clear to the hearer. Thus, reductionists appear to have a problem not only with
establishing the amount of knowledge-why required for a hearer to acquire testimonial understand-
ing, but also—and more importantly—with the very idea that a sufficient amount of knowledge-
why may in principle provide the hearer with moral understanding.
It is important to bear in mind that this argument against the reductionist account of
testifying moral understanding does not in itself speak in favor of non-reductionism. In order
for non-reductionists to have a point, they ought to show that moral understanding cannot be
acquired through testimony. It is against this latter claim that I shall argue in the next section.
3.2 An Alternative Account of the Transmissibility of Moral Understanding
The argument I want to offer against the alleged impossibility of transmitting moral under-
standing via testimony amounts to showing that there can be cases in which testimony conveys
moral understanding, where this involves the possession of cognitive control on the part of the
hearer. The proposed argument relies on a helpful distinction Kenneth Boyd has recently
drawn between two components of understanding, namely an informational component and a
grasping component (2017).8 According to Boyd, the informational component amounts to
possessing the information necessary to acquire understanding, while the grasping component
8 It should be noted that Boyd (2019) has proposed an alternative and independent strategy to overcome the
problem of the transmissibility of moral understanding, namely one that appeals to testimony as a cooperative
source. I shall set this proposal aside, as I am convinced that the problem under consideration can be successfully
addressed without resorting to his most recent conceptual framework.
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involves both the apt exercise of some kind of cognitive abilities on the part of the hearer and
the “relationships between the thing understood and either the reasons that make that thing true
or propositions that are related to it” (114).
Since testimony does not convey epistemic abilities from the speaker to the hearer, one
cannot acquire the grasping component through testimony and therefore testimony cannot
transmit understanding-why, as non-reductionists would predict. However, this is only the
natural result in a specific range of cases that Boyd calls instances of difficult understanding,
that is, cases requiring long-term effort and the exercise of many abilities on the part of the
hearer, such as understanding why Fermat’s Last Theorem can be solved or why time, unlike
space, seems to flow only in one direction. Other kinds of understanding, namely easy
understanding and easys understanding, impose less demanding requirements. As for the
former, anyone possessing minimum conceptual resources can achieve easy understanding
simply “by making sense of” the speaker’s utterances (119). For example, almost everyone can
achieve understanding of why “I need to leave Rome today” (p) by making sense of my further
testimony that “I am supposed to attend a dear friend’s wedding tomorrow in London” (q). As
for the latter, easys understanding follows a transmission mechanism similar to the one
concerning easy understanding, but it only applies to individuals who have a specific back-
ground familiarity with complex issues and have developed the necessary abilities to grasp the
information received without undertaking further reflective processes. For example, a philos-
ophy student might easily understand why “knowledge is factive” (p) through a further
explanation that “knowledge is an attitude that one can have only to true propositions” (q),
yet testimony fails to transmit understanding to individuals without a background in
philosophy.
How can it be, though, that testimony itself provides someone with understanding in those
easy or easys situations if grasping does not transmit? Satisfying the grasping component in
these cases does not demand much effort on the hearer’s part: making sense of the testimony is
all it takes for them to grasp the relationship between p and q. Hence, although the grasping
component, technically speaking, does not transmit from one person to another, it is still true
that the mere fact that one transmits their understanding-why through testimony suffices to let
the hearer acquire understanding-why. For making sense of the speaker’s utterances allows the
hearer to achieve both components of understanding at once. The argument thus demonstrates
that easy understanding and easys understanding can be passed on via testimony, just like
knowledge.9
These considerations on different kinds of understanding easily apply to the moral domain
too. Going back to the original version of the plagiarism example, establishing whether Peter
can acquire moral understanding of why plagiarism is wrong from Emily’s testimony depends
on his background familiarity with ethical issues and intellectual abilities. If Peter already
9 Someone might object that, on a standard view of what transmission is, for (moral) understanding to be
transmitted a subject B should understand ‘why p’ merely as a result of a subject A’s testimony ‘why p’. The
account defended here might seem to deviate from a standard account of transmission, in that for understanding
to be transmitted it is also required that B exercises their abilities to make sense of A’s testimony. As a response,
notice that transmission requires minimal work on the part of B even when the exchange transfers knowledge
rather than understanding. The sole difference is that transmitting understanding requires that B grasps/has
cognitive control over the connection between p and q (= the reason(s) why p), whereas transmitting knowledge
merely imposes that B makes minimal sense of the content of p and of the fact that q is the reason why p, as
required by assenting (see §2). Thus, the mere fact that B has to exercise their abilities to acquire understanding
via A’s testimony does not support the conclusion that the proposed account endorses a non-standard view of
transmission. I thank an anonymous reviewer for urging this clarification.
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possesses (a) enough background information about stealing and passing off another’s words
as your own, and (b) the necessary abilities to link the two concepts, nothing seems to prevent
Emily’s testimony from transmitting an instance of moral understanding to him. For while
Emily takes care of passing on the informational component, (a) and (b) allow him to satisfy
the grasping component simply by making sense of her words, as in cases of easys under-
standing. In contrast, were Peter to lack the conceptual resources to grasp how stealing may
involve intellectual property, Emily’s testimony could at best convey moral knowledge, yet not
moral understanding. The same argument applies to the revised version of this example: the
main difference between these cases would just be that in the latter Peter is required to possess
(b), while a significant portion of the work necessary to fulfil (a) is done by Emily’s detailed
testimony.
Before addressing a relevant objection against this argument, let me briefly shed light on its
advantages, namely how it avoids the problems with reductionism introduced in §3.2. As
regards the quantitative dimension of moral understanding, my view can concede that moral
understanding comes in degrees, yet the grasping component warrants a qualitative difference
between moral knowledge and moral understanding. That is: Peter could acquire more or less
understanding from Emily depending on the comprehensiveness of her testimony, the breadth
and depth of his background familiarity with ethical issues, and the degree to which he has
developed relevant intellectual virtues. However, he acquires an instance of moral understand-
ing only insofar as he grasps why stealing intellectual property is morally wrong.
As regards the qualitative dimension of moral understanding, all the information about the
epistemic possibilities that, on Sliwa’s account, are to be entertained or excluded for why p is
the case aptly features in the informational component of understanding on my account, but in
no way helps one satisfy the grasping component. Thus, the distinction between the two
components of understanding shows that providing Peter with more information about the
various reasons why plagiarism could be right or wrong does not guarantee that he fulfills the
grasping component and therefore that he acquires moral understanding via Emily’s testimony.
Hence, the proposed view of moral understanding is in a position to account for the
transmissibility of (instances of) understanding-why without reducing this notion to a mere
sum of (instances of) knowing-why.
3.3 Moral Understanding and the Problem of Epistemic Credit
A major worry with any account of the transmissibility of moral understanding has to do with
the problem of epistemic credit. Acquiring an instance of (moral) understanding, in general,
requires epistemic work on the part of the subject who needs to deploy their intellectual
abilities. Yet in the case of the transmission of moral understanding via testimony, a critic
would argue, the hearer is not doing enough work for their cognitive success to be credited to
them.
The objection closely resembles one that has been famously raised by Jennifer Lackey
against credit and virtue-theoretic epistemologies, that is, those theories on which a subject has
knowledge to the extent that the true belief they have formed can be appropriately credited to
them—or is the product of their cognitive abilities. In paradigmatic instances of testimonial
knowledge—e.g., the case of someone acquiring knowledge about the location of the train
station in an unknown town from a random passerby—the hearer forms their belief by relying
upon the speaker’s words, that is, by trusting them. Thus, since most part of the epistemic work
that allows the hearer to form a true belief is done by the speaker, Lackey notes, credit theories
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and virtue epistemology would be committed to the unreasonable conclusion that the hearer
does not acquire knowledge from testimony (2007).
The problem of the epistemic credit should be more troubling in the case of understanding,
if we bear in mind, first, that achieving understanding in general involves a greater deal of
intellectual abilities than achieving knowledge does, and second, that testimony does not seem
a suitable way to pass on intellectual abilities.
Nonetheless, the answers that have been put forth to address the problem in the case of
knowledge provide us with a strategy for replying to the objection in the case of understanding
too, or so I shall argue. Specifically, the answer I shall offer combines important remarks from
Riggs (2009) and Pritchard (2010, 2012). Riggs highlights that whenever we receive a piece of
testimony, we should at least be counterfactually sensitive to clues of hesitancy, mendacity, or
unreliability, no matter whether our testimonial belief will result from direct transmission or an
inferential process (2009: 211). Thus, regardless of which theory of testimonial justification one
wants to endorse, the hearer has some work to do even in ordinary cases of testimonial
knowledge. Pritchard, instead, draws an important distinction between cognitive successes that
are primarily creditable to the epistemic subject and cognitive successes that are creditable to
the subject to a significant degree (2010: 55; 2012: 273). Paradigmatic cases of transmission of
testimonial knowledge might not feature in the former set of cognitive successes, but they do
feature in the latter precisely because the hearer’s sensitivity to the aforementioned counterfac-
tual elements is key to account for her cognitive achievement, i.e., the fact that she acquires
knowledge via testimony.
If we apply these considerations to the proposed account of moral understanding, it should
not be difficult to see that the problem of easy credit can be successfully explained away. For
one thing, the very fact that understanding requires the satisfaction of a grasping component
accommodates the idea that the hearer needs to do some epistemic work. In general, it is
reasonable to expect that understanding demands more effort on the part of the hearer than that
needed to satisfy the counterfactual sensitivity requirement in the case of knowledge. How-
ever, we have just seen that in cases of easy and easys understanding, the hearer is able to
activate and successfully complete grasping processes simply by making sense of the speaker’s
words. It is not necessary to dwell on whether such grasping processes require more or less
effort than the counterfactual sensitivity does: it might well be the case that acquiring
testimonial knowledge about some extremely complex matters requires more work on the
part of the hearer than acquiring understanding in easy situations.10 All that matters here is to
show that even the easiest cases of transmission of understanding require some cognitive effort
on the part of the hearer.
For another thing, though easy cases of transmission of understanding do not constitute
cognitive successes that are primarily creditable to the hearer—since a lot hinges on whether
the speaker’s testimony is clear and comprehensive enough for the hearer to acquire
understanding—they are still cognitive successes that are creditable to the hearer to a signif-
icant degree. For the hearer would not acquire any moral understanding unless they were in a
position to grasp the connection between the moral proposition at stake and the reasons
adduced in support of that proposition. Thus, we can conclude that the distinction between
the two components of understanding and a careful consideration of the role played by the
grasping component allow the proposed account of moral understanding to successfully
address the concern with epistemic credit.
10 See Malfatti (forthcoming) for extensive discussion of this point.
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The proposed argument should not lead us to overlook the role the speaker plays in cases of
transmission of easy and easys understanding.
11 The speaker’s epistemic credit in testifying
understanding relates to two aspects: one has to do with the informational component and
amounts to transmitting true and justified propositions; the other has to do with the grasping
component and amounts to tailoring the breadth and depth of their testimony in such a way
that the hearer can grasp their meaning without further effort. If we go back to the plagiarism
example, it should not be taken for granted that Emily’s mere uttering p and q suffices to
transmit moral understanding about the wrongness of plagiarizing to an interlocutor. It might
be enough for Peter to grasp why plagiarism is wrong, supposing that he is already familiar
with the concepts of plagiarizing, stealing, and intellectual property, yet not for a younger child
who lacks these concepts. In this latter situation, whether moral understanding can be passed
on via testimony depends both on the child’s conceptual background and on Emily’s ability to
provide them with an explanation that fits their intellectual resources.12
As demonstrated by many examples involving education, both the speaker and the hearer
have some work to do to ensure the transmission of epistemic goods. The degree to which each
individual is involved admits of some variation depending on the nature of the epistemic good
at stake—that is, whether it is knowledge or understanding that is distributed—but we should
not expect to discover any epistemically significant asymmetry in the transmission processes
involving knowledge and easy or easys instances of understanding.
To summarize: this section has been devoted to showing that both reductionists and non-
reductionists are wrong about moral understanding and moral testimony. In §3.1, I showed
that, pace reductionists, passing on knowing-why via testimony does not suffice to provide one
with moral understanding. In §3.2, I outlined my alternative account of understanding-why
based on the distinction between an informational component and a grasping component and
showed how, on this account, pace non-reductionists, understanding can be transmitted via
testimony. §3.3 explained away the problem with the idea that the hearer does not deserve
credit for any moral understanding they acquire via testimony.
4 Moral Exemplars and the Capacity of Moral Understanding
The upshot of section 3 was to settle a longstanding debate in moral epistemology concerning
the relationship between (instances of) moral understanding and (instances of) moral testimo-
ny. Moral understanding intended as a capacity incurs problems of its own. In this section, I
shall explore whether the capacity of moral understanding requires the ability to engage in
moral reasoning. Rather than arguing in favor of an intellectualist or an anti-intellectualist
approach, the section shows that this debate has an impact on the discussion about the
requirements for moral virtue and moral exemplarity. I will focus on Zagzebski’s exemplarist
moral theory, as she contends that her view need not take a stand on whether the aforemen-
tioned ability is necessary for becoming an exemplar. Against this claim, I shall argue that the
accounts of moral exemplars resulting from how the two rival views answer such question are
so different that Zagzebski cannot remain neutral on the issue.
As should be clear from the characterization of cognitive control, Hills holds that the
capacity of moral understanding requires both the ability to follow explanations given by
11 See Gordon (2017: §4) for considerations on the speaker’s role in transmitting understanding.
12 See Croce (2018) for further considerations on transmitting understanding to children and novices.
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someone else—i.e., condition (i) of her notion of cognitive control—and the ability to give
explanations, that is, to explain why p in one’s own words—i.e., condition (ii). Sliwa has
recently challenged this view by arguing that Hills unjustifiedly conflates possessing moral
understanding and possessing the ability to articulate it. Sliwa proposes the following example:
Consider Julie, who is, by all accounts, a morally good person: honest, caring, and kind.
She is also extremely morally competent; for any moral situation she finds herself in, she
does the right thing because it strikes her as the right thing to do, and it strikes her as the
right thing to do because she responds to the morally relevant features of the situation.
[However,] when pressed for an explanation, she might just shrug her shoulders and
offer: “it’s just the right thing to do.” Or perhaps: “it would be unkind not to help.”
(2017: 541).
This example, Sliwa argues, puts pressure on Hills because we should find it intuitive that Julie
has deep moral understanding despite the fact that she lacks the ability to give appropriate
explanations of her moral judgments. On Sliwa’s view, distinguishing between the capacity of
moral understanding and the ability to articulate it explains why some morally relevant
situations strike us as inherently right or wrong although we might well lack the right words
to justify our judgments.
One way in which Hills could resist this conclusion and stick to the idea that Julie lacks the
capacity of moral understanding is to argue that we want our moral advisors to be people who
possess this capacity—that is, something for which the ability to give proper explanation of
one’s moral judgments is required. On closer inspection, this argumentative line does not seem
promising because, as Sliwa points out, it can be the case that one has the capacity of moral
understanding and serves as a moral advisor without being able to articulate their understand-
ing properly (542). Moral exemplars are the paradigmatic example of moral advisors who offer
guidance through their behavior rather than—or, at least, more than—their testimony. To the
extent that Julie’s behavior helps her acquaintances figure out what to believe or how to act in a
morally salient situation, she is providing moral advice in the way moral exemplars do.
Sliwa’s argument against conflating moral understanding with the ability to give explana-
tions of moral propositions seems compelling. As a matter of fact, it can well be the case that
one has the former without the latter, as Julie does in the aforementioned example. The
opposite also seems true, if we imagine that some individuals may have developed sophisti-
cated skills in communicating complex concepts to others, especially laypeople, and yet fail to
see the connection between p and q when this involves some sphere of interest or clashes with
their deeply entrenched prejudices.13
Nonetheless, Sliwa’s argument has a wider impact on the debate about moral virtue and
moral exemplarism than she herself has argued. For her argument entails that the ability to
provide moral explanations is not necessary for one to be a moral exemplar. If we stick to
Zagzebski’s seminal work on this topic, moral exemplars are exceptionally good individuals
whose behavior we admire and desire to imitate. The most appropriate way to cash out their
exceptional goodness is in terms of moral virtues,14 which Zagzebski defines as deep and
enduring acquired traits that we admire upon reflection, consisting of a disposition to have a
13 Sliwa makes the case of moral philosophers who can reason well about fairness and equality but systematically
fail to spot instances of gender inequality right in front of them (2017: 543).
14 See, e.g., Adams (1984), Wolf (1982).
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certain emotion that initiates and directs action towards an end, and reliable success in reaching
that end (2017: 113).
The central question linking moral exemplarity and the ability to provide moral
explanations is whether being morally virtuous requires that one possesses this ability.
Sliwa’s view aligns with anti-intellectualism—also called the naivety view (Hills 2015:
11)—according to which it is not characteristic of a fully morally virtuous person that
they have the aforementioned explanatory ability. All that matters for full moral virtue,
from an anti-intellectualist perspective, is that one be reliably disposed to do the right
thing for the right reasons, regardless of whether one can also explain why they act as
they do. In contrast, Hills answers this question in the affirmative following the intel-
lectualist take typical of Aristotelian virtue ethics (Annas 2011; Hursthouse 1999),
according to which a fully morally virtuous person not only grasps the morally relevant
features of a situation in which they find themselves, but also has the ability to explain
why a course of action is right (or wrong).
Zagzebski holds that that “exemplarism has the advantage of neutrality on the relative
place of reasoning and emotion in moral behavior” (2017: 142) and takes this to be a
further advantage of her view, one that presumably allows her to avoid entering into the
dispute between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. In principle, this move seems
entirely legitimate, as Zagzebski might well think that the ability to give an explanation
of one’s actions is a separate condition on moral exemplarity, namely one that is
compatible with—but not entailed by—possessing moral virtue.15 However, she also
points out that Annas’ account of moral virtue fits well with her own exemplarist model
of moral learning (2017: 138, n. 12), thereby eliciting the thought that moral
exemplarism should align with the intellectualist tradition.
This ambiguity calls for further investigation especially because intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism deliver two extensionally different sets of moral exemplars depending on
whether the ability to give an account of one’s action is taken to be necessary for moral virtue.
In the remainder of this section, I shall explore whether Zagzebski’s account of moral
exemplars is compatible with the diagnosis that intellectualists and anti-intellectualists would
offer of Julie’s case cited above. The proposed analysis will support a surprising conclusion,
namely that exemplarism is bound to fit better with anti-intellectualism than with
intellectualism.
According to a strong intellectualist reading, Julie is not a moral exemplar because
exemplars are exceptionally virtuous individuals and moral virtue requires the ability to engage
in moral reasoning which she lacks by definition. However, it is far from clear that this
diagnosis of the case sits well within Zagzebski’s theory, for Julie has the right motivations and
reliably succeeds in doing the right thing for the right reason. Surely, her admirability does not
depend on the ability to give moral explanations; rather, it is her behavior that manifests her
exceptional attitude of care, honesty, and kindness. To the extent that other individuals can
appreciate her virtues and admire her acts, there seems to be nothing to prevent the exemplarist
dynamic from occurring (Croce 2019): Julie’s example can naturally lead those who admire
her to become more virtuous and might even be used to educate pupils in the spheres of
honesty, care, and kindness.
Intellectualists might not be entirely satisfied with this strong reading and propose an
alternative, i.e., weaker, diagnosis of the case, according to which Julie is only virtuous
15 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
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to some degree. For she is genuinely honest, kind, and caring, but fails to be fully
morally virtuous, due to the fact that she does not possess all the virtues and lacks a
relevant component of moral understanding—i.e., the capacity to engage in moral
reasoning. This diagnosis does not reduce the standards of intellectualism as a
theory—which is committed to the unity of the virtues thesis (e.g., Annas 2011;
Russell 2009; Wolf 2007) as well as to the thesis that moral virtue requires the ability
to give an explanation of one’s instances of moral understanding—but only those of
moral exemplarity. Simply put, on this view “partial moral virtue” (Hills 2015: 34) might
be sufficient for one to be a moral exemplar. The proposed weaker intellectualist reading
has a relevant drawback of its own. On a standard exemplarist approach, moral exem-
plars are not less-than-fully virtuous individuals, but rather exceptionally virtuous indi-
viduals, namely ones whose virtuousness is most evident in how they behave, thereby
eliciting our admiration. Thus, the very idea of an exemplar as a partially virtuous
individual does not sit well with the spirit of an exemplarist moral theory.
The limits of the intellectualist diagnoses of Julie’s case invite us to consider alternative
readings that anti-intellectualists might have to offer. The most plausible is one in which Julie
is a moral exemplar in that she displays some virtues at an exceptional level and manages to
deploy them in any situation in which she finds herself, as Sliwa describes. In other words,
Julie embodies the features of what Driver would consider an expert practitioner of honesty,
kindness, and care, that is, someone who is exceptionally virtuous because they do the right
thing in the right situation although their moral understanding may not include the ability to
give a proper account of their decisions and actions (2013).16 This diagnosis has some
advantages over the alternatives. Unlike the strong intellectualist reading, it grants Julie the
status of a moral exemplar, as we would intuitively do before entering into the discussion
between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Unlike the weak intellectualist reading, it
considers moral exemplarity as an exceptional—rather than a partial—form of moral virtu-
ousness and is not committed to the unity of the virtues thesis. In contrast, anti-intellectualists
typically endorse a disunitarist perspective, according to which one can possess a genuine
virtue without possessing all others (e.g., Badwhar 1996; Walker 1993; Williams 1985). This
view is more concessive than intellectualism insofar as it accommodates the idea that fulfilling
the requirements of an expert practitioner of some—and not necessarily all—of the virtues, as
Julie does, suffices for one to be a moral exemplar.
The proposed analysis has clarified that morally good individuals—like Julie in our
example—may feature in the set of moral exemplars depending on whether one deems the
ability to engage in moral reasoning as necessary for moral virtue. This should suffice to explain
why Zagzebski is not entitled to stay neutral on the issue and to provide (at least partial) support
for the thesis that her exemplarism sits better with anti-intellectualism than intellectualism.
Before concluding, I shall offer two further reasons that speak in favor of this conclusion.
The first reason has to do with Zagzebski’s proposed methodology to ground her moral
theory in morally exemplary subjects instead of concepts such as “human nature” or “reason”.
Zagzebski is clear that virtues make people admirable (2017: 113) and that they involve
knowledge and understanding (1996: 134). If we stick to her exemplarist methodology,
though, it seems evident that in most cases our admiration of moral exemplars is in fact
16 Expert practitioners differ from what Driver calls expert judgers in that the former are responsive to moral
reasons without being aware of what these reasons are and/or able to spell them out in an explanation, as the latter
do reliably (2013: 286).
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directed toward the actions revealing their virtuousness rather than the considerations they
might offer to explain why they act as they do. Far from providing a conclusive argument in
favor of anti-intellectualism, this remark indicates that there seems to be no strong reason why,
on an exemplarist approach, the ability to give an account of one’s moral reasoning should be a
necessary feature of moral exemplars. Rather, what matters is that moral exemplars show us
what virtue amounts to in concrete situations.
The second reason has to dowith Zagzebski’s explicit considerations on the unity of the virtues
thesis. She argues that empirical observation of exemplars can offer a way to verify this thesis—
e.g., by showing us whether displaying a vice is sufficient to undermine moral exemplarity—and
that she herself does not endorse it (2017: 120–121). Anti-intellectualism appears to be better
suited to accommodate Zagzebski’s concern precisely because it is compatible with disunitarism
about moral virtues and, in turn, can account for the moral exemplarity of individuals like Julie,
who display some virtues to an exceptional degree but lack full moral virtue.17
This section has explored an important issue with moral understanding intended as a capacity,
that is, a particular way in which moral understanding has a bearing on the debate about moral
virtue and exemplarity. I first argued that if the capacity of moral understanding is a necessary
condition for one to be a moral exemplar, then proponents of exemplarist moral theories are
committed to take a stand on whether moral understanding involves an ability to engage in moral
reasoning. I then attempted to motivate the idea that anti-intellectualism about moral virtue
accommodates the demands of Zagzebski’s exemplarism better than intellectualism does.
5 Conclusion
It comes as no surprise that questions about the role of moral understanding in our intellectual
and practical agency, and the relationship between the capacity of moral understanding and
moral virtue are receiving an increasing level of attention in current discussions in moral
epistemology and virtue ethics. This work has sought to advance both debates at once by
showing what theorists in either area should (not) do. As regards the debate about moral
testimony and moral understanding, I argued that neither reductionism nor non-reductionism
should appeal to the argument from moral testimony to claim a positional advantage over its
rival view. On the account I offered (§3), the fact that possessing instances of moral under-
standing involves a dispositional element—i.e., cognitive control—does not exclude that
moral understanding can be transmitted via testimony. As regards the debate about the
capacity of moral understanding, virtue, and moral exemplarity, I argued that proponents of
exemplarist theories need to say more about whether being a virtuous exemplar requires that
one has the ability to engage in moral reasoning (§4). Furthermore, I suggested that
Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory aligns better with anti-intellectualist views of moral
virtue, according to which the ability to engage in moral reasoning is not a necessary condition
for one to be virtuous. If my arguments hit their target, this paper has suggested new directions
toward which the discussion about moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue
ethics should proceed.18
17 I have defended this claim at length in Croce and Vaccarezza (2017).
18 Thanks to Duncan Pritchard and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this
paper. This paper was presented at the 3rd Aretai Conference, held at the European University (Rome) in 2018,
and I am grateful to the audience for their comments. Work on this article has received funding from the
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT, Portugal) under grant agreement CEECIND/02143/2017.
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